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Abstract This article critically examines engagements of
village leaders in an NGO-facilitated participatory conser-
vation program in eastern Indonesia. It explores how the
program’s implementation strengthened leadership legiti-
macy of a dominant customary social group. Customary
leaders ensured distribution according to particular norms,
and in organizing village governance upheld specific in-
terests and claims over natural resources. Villagers outside
of the customary group remained marginalized in village
governance, despite being important stakeholders.
Findings reveal complex relationships between leaders
and villagers that were strongly framed by orders of pow-
er and cultural history, which influenced how and to what
extent peripheral groups participated. The case study con-
cludes that village leaders can form effective avenues to
deliver on conservation outcomes. However, in their pre-
occupation with maintaining leadership legitimacy, they
may inadequately address dynamic intra-community ten-
sions that could jeopardize long-term outcomes. Co-
management partners can play significant roles in
adapting management and prompting more inclusive gov-
ernance processes.
Keywords Customary leadership . Local governance .
Community-based natural resourcemanagement . Marine
conservation . Eastern Indonesia
Introduction
Contemporary conservation and development practices in-
creasingly recognize the importance of social justice and the
rights of local/indigenous groups (Peterson et al. 2008), and
are progressively being implemented through more
decentralized management frameworks (Bardhan 2002). In
Indonesia the political decentralization processes introduced
since 1999, with the enactment of the regional autonomy law,1
devolved formal administrative authority from central to pro-
vincial, district and subdistrict levels in part to catalyze more
local involvement (Hadiz 2004; Resosudarmo 2004; Hidayat
2005; Yamazaki et al. 2015). Local resource user groups in
Indonesia are assuming significant roles in terms of both the
physical implementation of conservation and natural resource
management projects and the design of associated interven-
tions and approaches (Hidayat and Antlov 2004; Fox et al.
2005; Fritzen 2007). Although this is arguably positive, criti-
cisms of community-based approaches often allude to sub-
stantial discrepancies between projected outputs from inter-
ventions and the reality of on-the-ground results (Cleaver
1999), and contribute to perceived ‘failure’ of community-
based initiatives (Dasgupta and Beard 2007). Projects indeed
are rarely implemented as stipulated in a-priori project plans;
however this article is careful not to assume this as failure.
Instead, it endeavors to show how local leadership strategies
are applied to access, or appropriate, project resources toward
1 Law No. 22/1999 on regional autonomy and later through the revised
Law No. 32/2004 on local government.
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community wide, dominant group and/or private interests in
cases where external frameworks are flexible enough to allow
village leadership to adapt them. It thus critically examines
assumptions of self-interested leadership and ‘elite capture’
in natural resource management (Platteau and Gaspart 2003;
Persha and Andersson 2014).
A primary objective of community-based conservation ini-
tiatives, as well as centrally coordinated rural development pro-
grams, is to achieve equity in benefit distribution and allow a
fair allocation of resources so as to gain maximum breadth in
beneficiaries and efficacy of interventions (Klain et al. 2014).
However, in establishing collaborative partnerships, often too
little is understood of the local processes and politics of partic-
ipation, or how roles of leadership are enacted, by whom and
why. The influx of external resources into villages through such
programs, in cases where different understandings and cultures
of governance meet, may well produce contextually relevant
hybrid practices (Cinner and Aswani 2007). As a result, ‘new’
governance and decision-making processes form that draw to
varying degrees from official project-driven governing tools,
administrative government, as well as customary law and
norms (Cohen and Steenbergen 2015).2 Projects, and the local
governance landscapes within which they are implemented, are
actively transformed by local leaders’ roles in implementation,
despite the defined objectives, methods and outputs stipulated
in management plans (Morgan-Trimmer 2013). New collabo-
rations develop through negotiations, amalgamations and con-
solidations at the interface between local and ‘outsiders’ inter-
pretations of the roles and functions of leadership in a particular
governance context. Critically examining how external re-
sources are channeled through social groups in a community
will reveal what structures and interests influence the direction
of a project. This in turn can more accurately determine the
value and sustainability of conservation project outcomes, as
measured in terms of environmental change as well as their
different impacts on various groups and individuals.
Elite Capture, Leadership and Participation
Much of the attention in conservation and development pro-
gram design is dedicated to creating systems that minimize
free-rider behavior, corrupt practice or elite capture, and that
maximize fair and targeted allocation or equitable benefit dis-
tribution (Bodin and Crona 2008).3 Although program
designs often assume action by elite groups or individuals to
be rationally driven by self-interest over collective goals
(Gugerty and Kremer 2008), in fact these groups may employ
strategies tomaximize collective benefit in ways that adhere to
local dominant culture and/or overcome contextual challenges
(which may not have been accounted for in formal program
design). In his review of approaches addressing elite capture,
Wong (2010: 2) identifies ‘counter’ and ‘co-opt’ strategies to
deal with elite capture. The former involve approaches that
suggest a need to counteract elite tendencies through their
exclusion from project management and design, based on as-
sumptions that elites operate purely out of self-interest and
thus are by definition impediments to collective good out-
comes. The latter approaches suggest that cooperation with
elite individuals or groups may provide opportunities to use
existing leadership legitimacies constructively to incorporate
otherwise disenfranchised and marginal groups. This aligns
with more nuanced understandings of behavior by elites or
leaders as being subject to complex relationships with, and
accountabilities to, a wider society (Platteau and Abraham
2002). In the context of this study, local elites are identified
as those customary leaders of a community, whose privileged
positions are defined by family networks, land holdings, reli-
gious affiliation, personal history and personality (following
Dasgupta and Beard 2007). These elites hold significant
village-wide governing power and represent a majority group
in an administrative village which also includes a minority
group outside the customary (adat) network that despite its
marginal position forms an important stakeholder group in
conservation management contexts.
Studying impacts of collaborations across the interface be-
tween community leadership and external actors requires in-
depth inquiry into the social and political complexities within
a village leadership constellation, and between leaders and
members of other social groups. This in turn reflects how
and why particular individuals, as ‘elites’ or otherwise, appear
as community leaders. Relations between different leadership
constellations that flow from underlying social divisions, by
no means suggest that the social groups identified here are
homogenous and without internal contestation. In focusing
on current dominant leadership constellations of the village’s
customary (adat) core families the study highlights potentially
contentious problems of representation at village level
(Baland and Platteau 1997, 1998; Lund and Saito-Jensen
2013) so as to understand how different groups operate under
current leadership conditions. To make sense of village lead-
ership, the study acknowledges that leadership materializes
frommore than simply the actions of individuals in leadership
positions; aligning with Case et al.’s (2015: 3) understanding
of leadership that argues for more Bcomplex, rounded, and
nuanced interpretations of leadership practices, which are sen-
sitive to cultural contexts, plural perspectives, and
contestation^. The dynamic nature of these constellations,
2 In the Indonesian context discussed in this article, local governance
typically involves some combination of state-based administrative village
(desa dinas) government and customary village (desa adat) norms, rules
and values.
3 This is also reflected in the considerable body of literature devoted to
addressing issues of elite capture in propoor natural resourcemanagement
and development initiatives (Platteau 2004; Dasgupta and Beard 2007;
Persha and Andersson 2014)
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and the changing relationships which predispose various alli-
ances or oppositions, thus warrants recognition of the tempo-
ral and social contextual limits of the findings from this case
study.
The study draws from ethnographic research carried out in
the remote island community of Tanimbar Kei, located among
the Kei islands in eastern Indonesia (Fig. 1). Like many re-
mote communities in Indonesia, leaders here need to address
potentially dichotomous objectives – in particular to advance
conservation and development without pursuing these at the
cost of livelihoods, resource sustainability or loss of important
customary practices and values. It is in examining which prac-
tices and norms are given precedence over others that group-
specific sets of interests become important. The dilemma of
negotiating what is beneficial, acceptable or intrusive change
is highly contextual and dependent strongly on who in the
community is asking the question, and with what short and
long term implications. The analysis therefore seeks to show
to what extent, and in what ways, local leadership strategies
reflect a need to legitimize leaders’ positions to a wider local
constituency. It also needs to account for the fact that ‘legiti-
macy’may reflect the perspectives and interests of a dominant
group, in this case the customary (adat) group in Tanimbar
Kei, more than that of the village as a whole. This leads to the
question of whether a dominant group’s authority offers an
appropriate starting point for conservation projects (Labonte
2012; Steenbergen and Visser 2016), and whether such align-
ments can be conducive to the sort of institutional bricolage
that Cleaver (2001, 2012) suggests effective adaptive strate-
gies could be built upon.
The conservation program at the center of this study is a
community-based marine conservation program involved in
establishing a Locally Managed Marine Area (LMMA) in the
village of Tanimbar Kei. This program involves an Indonesian
NGO known as the Indonesian LocallyManagedMarine Area
Network (I-LMMA).4 I-LMMA follows implementation of
local marine conservation programs along community-based
adaptive management principles (Govan et al. 2008 ) that are
receptive to the particular local conditions of communities
which have tended to rely on longstanding customary institu-
tions (I-LMMA 2011). The program is particularly relevant,
since its organizational structure and approach to collaborative
conservation offers partners (i.e. coastal communities) signif-
icant autonomy, implying that community actors have a pri-
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Fig. 1 Map of the Kei
Archipelago (Southeast Maluku
district in Maluku province)
4 Henceforth. ‘I-LMMA’ will be used when referring to the NGO, while
‘LMMA’ will be used when referring to the village program.
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provides the opportunity to examine if, how and why local
adjustments to management of a program occur.
Methods
The study is based on data collected in the community of
Tanimbar Kei, during a seven-month residence there between
August 2010 and February 2011, followed by five subsequent
visits of up to 3 weeks each between 2013 and 2015. My
ethnographic engagement with villagers in daily livelihood
activities, through participant observations and frequent con-
versations with key informants provided most of the data used
here. Semi-structured interviews were carried out with vil-
lagers (n = 55) during the initial data collection period to learn
about people’s perception of, and participation in the village
LMMA program. In this same period a survey on local lead-
ership and village governance was carried out with 42 house-
holds in the village, which were randomly selected after strat-
ifying the data population according to hamlet size. Although
the name of the village is used here, the identities of my re-
spondents remain anonymous, and only public positions are
named when referring to individual leaders.
Tanimbar Kei
In a country made up of over 18,100 islands, with an estimated
60 % of its 250 million people living on small islands or
within 50 km of any coastline (CTI-CFF 2009), dependence
on coastal resources in Indonesia is high. The archipelago’s
political center revolves strongly around the island of Java,
with the remote eastern-most regions of Maluku and Papua
being the least populated (Cribb and Ford 2009). However,
the exceptionally rich coastal waters in this eastern frontier not
only sustain the nutritional, livelihood and cultural needs of
millions of island people, but over various periods have
attracted diverse international and domestic commercial
fishing fleets (Novaczek et al. 2001). As a result the
governance seascape in contemporary Maluku sees
coastal resources subject to various governing systems
including central government policy and local customary
law (Thorburn 2000).
Tanimbar Kei Island is located some 4 hours by motorized
fishing boat (body) from the Kei Archipelago’s main island of
Kei Kecil (Fig. 1), and falls under the Kei Kecil Barat
Subdistrict as part of the Southeast Maluku District in
Maluku Province. The island’s village shares its name and is
made up of approximately 125 households with a population
of about 507 people (Kecamatan Kei Kecil Barat 2010). The
village is administered under a single village (desa) adminis-
tration with no administrative hamlet (dusun) subdivisions,
despite there being significant historically and physically
distinct groupings within the village.5 The main settlement
for example is divided into a traditional older section on
higher ground and a newer section along the village’s fore-
shore. Another smaller settlement, known asMun, of about 16
households is located some three kilometers north east along
the northern coast and is made up largely of migrant settlers of
Bugis background. Although Tanimbar Kei identifies itself as
a Hindu village, four religions are represented; including in
order of size: Hindu, Protestant and Catholic in the main set-
tlement, and Muslim in the Mun settlement.
Livelihoods on the island largely depend on the surround-
ing marine environment. As indicated in Fig. 2, since 2005 the
local village economy has shifted focus toward the cultivation,
processing and trade in seaweed (carrageenophyte seaweed of
genera Euchema, referred to locally as agar agar), to become
the main source of household income across the village.Many
households also still tend coconut plantations to produce and
sell copra to middlemen, albeit of lesser importance than be-
fore 2005. Fish and other reef-based marine resources are an
important part of people’s staple nutritional intake. Given the
distance to the larger Kei Islands and lack of cool storage
technology, only a small portion of total village catch is traded
and only by a few households selling to other households in
the village. Aside from marine oriented livelihood activities,
households typically maintain small agricultural plots where
they plant limited hardy root crops (e.g., cassava), fruit (e.g.,
papaya) and vegetables (e.g., string beans). The island’s low-
lying limestone substratum means soils are infertile and op-
portunity for extensive agriculture is limited. Basic food sta-
ples like rice are bought from markets on Kei Kecil.
Both men and women take part in most land-based eco-
nomic activities (i.e., copra or other food production), albeit
with different responsibilities. Marine-based activities beyond
the mudflats are exclusively carried out by men (e.g., reef and
pelagic fishing), while women share in activities within the
intertidal zone (i.e., inside the confines of the fringing reef)
such as seaweed farming and gleaning for mollusks. Other
more specialized income sources on the island include boat-
building, community shops (kios), and bulk transport to Kei
Kecil. There are a handful of villagers that work as civil ser-
vants, but only one resides permanently in the village (other
civil servants in the village include teachers and a health work-
er posted from elsewhere).
In comparison to mainland villages Tanimbar Kei lacks
physical infrastructure. With no connection to an electricity-
grid households must produce their own power from genera-
tors. The village offers up to primary school education and a
health center with a fulltime health worker who can provide
5 In Maluku indigenous terms are officially used instead of the standard
Indonesian government terminology noted here, namely ohoi for village
and ohoi soa for hamlet. To allow for contextual comparison beyond
Maluku cases, national terminology is used throughout this article.
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basic treatment and maternity care. For secondary school ed-
ucation or more specialized healthcare villagers must travel to
the district capital Langgur on mainland Kei Kecil. Fresh wa-
ter is exclusively sourced from ground wells, whereby a single
well located near the Muslim settlement of Mun provides the
island’s main drinking water supply since most ground wells
are brackish and used for washing. Mobile phone reception
reached Tanimbar Kei only since late 2012, which has allowed
for more frequent communication with the mainland.
Considering the small island’s remoteness and people’s de-
pendence on the marine environment, livelihoods on
Tanimbar Kei are highly vulnerable.6 As similarly reported
in other cases of remote and vulnerable societies (Bankoff
2007; Beekman et al. 2009; Schwarz et al. 2011), the different
groups of households that make up Tanimbar Kei village ex-
hibit exceptionally high internal social cohesion. This reflects
in the persisting recognition amongst Tanimbar Kei’s residents
that they all are subject, in varying degrees depending on their
social position, to the strong customary system (adat) de-
scribed in Barraud’s (1979) extensive anthropological study
of Tanimbar Kei. This is despite the withering away of much
of the traditional governance systems in neighboring island
communities closer to Kei Kecil. Traditional governance pro-
cesses on Tanimbar Kei continue to revolve around customary
social organization (Barraud 1979: 87). Twenty-three patrilin-
eal social units referred to as ‘houses’ or rahan (Barraud 1979:
87–94) form the entirety of Tanimbar Kei adat society. Each
of the 23 rahan belong to one of three superior units known as
la-owan, which are led by what are believed to be Tanimbar
Kei’s three founder lineages. Together, the 23 ‘houses’ form
the adat core of the village. The authority of a particular rahan
over another rahanwithin a la-owan is context dependent, since
responsibility over particular matters is customarily assigned to
certain rahan. Although over the last decades the village has
expanded to include households of migrants or extended family
units, members of the 23 houses or rahan still make up the
majority of the village. About 75% of villagers claim some form
of close association through direct kin ties or marriage, making
them eligible for particular inheritances associated with a rahan,
including rights to land and adat responsibilities.
Although accounts from villagers showed that adat leader-
ship, prior to any conservation program, indeed influenced
how people used resources, this was not particularly motivat-
ed by conservation. The opening and closure of marine re-
source harvests in times of need, for example, was determined
by adat leaders who communicated with spirits to ask permis-
sion or attain their blessing (Cohen and Steenbergen 2015).
However, a notable intervention by adat leaders occurred fol-
lowing extensive degradation to the island’s reefs and fish
stock in 1990s due to bomb fishing by outside fishers and
particularly due to impacts of a live fish trade company that
operated over their reefs. Under an agreement with local adat
leaders the company employed Tanimbar Kei fishers to collect
live fish, and paid an annual concession fee to the adat leaders.
The destructive effects on coral of the potassium cyanide sup-
plied to the divers by the company showed after several years,
in addition to particular reef species (e.g., Napoleon wrasse -
Cheilinus undulatus), being all but fished out by 1998. In that
year adat leaders reportedly terminated the collaboration and
collectively demanded that the company leave. In the years
following their exit, little consolidated effort materialized
amongst adat leaders to improve marine areas due to what a
local leader described as Ba lack of technical knowledge in the
village^ on how to address the acute ecological degradation.
Their lack of capacity to address the degradation eventually
led to I-LMMA’s invitation by the village head in 2005.
6 This was evident from villagers’ response to significant and immediate
losses in villagers’ income, food security and wellbeing following low
seaweed yields in the recent past; access to their marine resources cush-
ioned vulnerability rather than access to urban centers like Langgur.
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Fig. 2 Average natural resource-based income distribution of Tanimbar Kei households in 2000 and 2012
Local Centers of Governance in Tanimbar Kei
The seven principles ofHukum Larvur Ngabal (‘laws of the red
blood and lance’)7 persist as the foundational structure of cus-
tomary law and order on the Kei Islands (Laksono 2000; Adhuri
2006, 2013), particularly in recent years after recognition of adat
institutions under Law No. 32/2004 on regional government
(Thorburn 2008). The seven principles set out values associated
with individual moral conduct, mutual respect, property owner-
ship and the strongly hierarchical system of social ranks.
Although Tanimbar Kei, like all Kei communities, is subject to
these broader laws, Tanimbar Kei society developed a distinctly
different niche set of principles (Barraud 1979). Customary law
here is dictated by perceived connections to the spirit world and
materialized through villagers’ relations with one another and
their marine environment.
The customary governance structure around decision mak-
ing in contemporary Tanimbar Kei is still rooted in the rahan
constellation and enacted through a traditional council made
up of heads of each rahan who are appointed based on the
patrilineal inheritance. The involvement of all rahan heads
suggests there is more consensus-based decision-making here
(at least within the adat core group) compared to elsewhere on
the Kei islands. Not all village matters are necessarily brought
to this council, however. Smaller intra-village disputes are for
example addressed by particular leadership figures associated
with the group where the dispute occurred, as is the case with
Mun, where the Muslim leader assumes a primary role in
conflict resolution. Religious leaders from all four religious
groups play a significant role in local social conflict resolu-
tion, although at a village level they function below the au-
thority of customary adat leaders. More recently legal matters
and inter-village conflicts have increasingly become the do-
main of the official village administration (desa dinas), but as
demonstrated in the following section there is strong influence
and representation of adat in the village administration.
The establishment of Suharto’s New Order regime in 1966
saw the implementation of an Indonesian central state bureau-
cratic system that extended down to village level, consolidated
under Law No. 5/1979 on village government. In Tanimbar
Kei village, governing structures were instituted whereby lo-
cal adat systems were superseded by the national Indonesian
legal system. In part enabled by its remote location, Tanimbar
Kei leaders remained strongly linked to their traditional
governing institutions and maintained these substantively in-
tact. For example under Tanimbar Kei’s customary adat struc-
ture (before central state influence), the role of village head
could only be occupied by individuals from one rahan lineage
and was historically inherited along patrilineal lines, rather
than through open elective processes. It furthermore represent-
ed more of a diplomatic responsibility as the ‘face of the vil-
lage’ in its engagement with outsiders, and was thus not
regarded as a singular point of authority, nor did it involve
administrative responsibilities or presuppose extra benefits
like a stipend. This contrasts with official village administra-
tion under Indonesian law, which is locally understood as a
body of externally derived authority backed by central
government.
Tracing back bureaucratic village leadership in Tanimbar
Kei since its implementation in the late 1970s shows that these
positions have always been occupied by men from the 23
rahan of the adat core. The first appointment of an official
(dinas) village head was reportedly around 1975, and saw the
head of the rahan associated with the customary role of vil-
lage representation in external engagements assume this posi-
tion. Since then the position has been filled by others from the
adat core structure following more elective processes, al-
though eligibility for candidature remained implicitly depen-
dent on inherited entitlements under adat, and more recently
on being Hindu. In one instance the son of a previous village
head made claim to the position of village head, however his
challenge was rejected by village elders since he had convert-
ed from Hinduism to Christianity (Protestant), and thus was
no longer eligible to lead Tanimbar Kei. Similarly, the official
village council (Badan Permusyawaratan Desa, BPD), as the
main village planning and consultative structure under
Indonesian law, was at the time of the research dominated
five-to-one by elders or representatives from the 23 rahan
7 These laws are woven in local myth and legend, and are believed to
have been instilled by early Balinese migrants who sought to bring law
and order to a disjointed system of tribal warfare (Adhuri 2006).
Customary social structure
(tokoh adat) 








Fig. 3 Schematic representation of Tanimbar Kei’s governance centres
based on village leaders’ association to one or more of the village
leadership institutions, with indication of Mun’s relative representation
in village-wide governance bodies
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adat core. As a result customary village leadership norms still
strongly shape village governance and steer engagements with
external institutions and organizations.
The administrative parameters associated with official vil-
lage government (e.g. fixed terms, democratic election proce-
dures and embeddedness in national bureaucratic frameworks),
have in more recent decades bureaucratized the village head
position. Nonetheless, among the local governing centers in
Tanimbar Kei, the customary adat core social order, and the
powerful rahan heads that collectively comprise its leadership
‘elite’, maintain the highest level of leadership legitimacy. The
hierarchy among rahan heads is determined in part by the spe-
cific roles historically bestowed on their rahan, in particular the
three leading rahan of the respective la-owan, but appears also
to be influenced by personality. One of the heads of the three
leading rahan, for example, possesses significant authority
through his inherited role as ceremonial master of important
adat rituals involved in annual collective millet cultivation.
His authority over adat matters in particular is very strong
and is embedded not only in his authoritative presence, but also
in the respect among villagers of his exclusive knowledge of,
and connections to, the spirit world. Another of the three lead-
ing rahan heads, claims lesser authority over adat-ritual mat-
ters, but is a prominent leading voice in village decision-mak-
ing, planning and development. He too assumes significant
respect from villagers, largely based on his personality and
proven leadership track-record over the years.
The three leadership bodies often associated with official
village governance in Indonesian villages, namely the village
government (desa dinas), the religious council (tokoh agama)
and the traditional council (tokoh adat), do not stand on equal
ground in Tanimbar Kei. As schematically presented in Fig. 3,
adat leadership in Tanimbar Kei is dominant and strongly
embedded in adat identity amongst the 23-rahan adat core
group. Primary membership in this group is defined by direct
kinship connection and religious affiliation to Hinduism.
Where there are examples of adat kin members that have
converted to other religions, these individuals may still iden-
tify with the adat community, take part in adat ceremonies
and make claim to particular land, but they cannot become
head of a house or fulfil adat leadership roles. Albeit second-
ary to adat leadership, religious leaders from all four religions
on the island are important figures also and have come to be
integrated in one way or another into village governance. For
example, the final institutionalizing of various village regula-
tions requires sign-off by the religious council, next to the
traditional council and village government. Under I-
LMMA’s facilitation the village conservation program was
first to apply these requirements, however since then these
have been independently applied to legitimize agreements
made in village-wide government development initiatives.
The administrative village government (desa dinas) is a
more recent institution, yet increasingly gains currency as an
avenue to access resources and infrastructure through national
development programs. The vast majority of its staff belongs
to the adat core group. However several well-respected fig-
ures, as for example the Catholic Church leader, are also in-
volved. Originally from a village on the mainland of Kei
Kecil, he married into an adat family and has ever since lived
in the adat core section of Tanimbar Kei. Being well educated
and from a high ranking social order on Kei Kecil8 has likely
aided his integration. However, many claimed his authorita-
tive, calm personality and his reputation for fair judgement
gave him his prominent position in village government and
in the LMMA village program.
Integration of the smaller Muslim hamlet of Mun in
village-level leadership does not extend beyond involve-
ment in village government of the Muslim leader (imam)
and several elders (who in fact make up part of the custom-
ary adat group and are still recognized as important fig-
ures, but have settled in Mun through marriage). Without
administrative hamlet status there is no separate body
representing interests for Mun residents specifically. As a
result most involvement in village government matters by
these elders is primarily through the village administra-
tion’s consultative meetings rather than by an integrated
process that recognizes a formal role for Mun in deci-
sion-making. This is evident also in their low participation
in the village LMMA program.
Indonesian Locally Managed Marine Area Network
The village LMMA conservation program functions under a
co-management partnership with the Indonesian Locally
Managed Marine Area Network (I-LMMA). Being a relative-
ly small NGO, I-LMMA regards its assets as largely embed-
ded in the community programs it mentors. Although focus
remains small scale, I-LMMA’s larger vision is Bto create and
share a community-based, sustainable, and fair marine re-
source management model for coastal areas and small islands
in Eastern Indonesia^ (I-LMMA 2011: 1). Tanimbar Kei’s
LMMA program aims to assist in developing sustainable local
management regimes for marine resources primarily for the
socio-economic benefit of the community as a whole. The first
collaboration started in 2005 when Tanimbar Kei’s village
head participated in a workshop on sustainable sea-
cucumber cultivation facilitated by I-LMMA. Shortly after-
ward he invited I-LMMA to the island to discuss ways to
8 In the Kei islands three social groups exist, resulting from the historical
sequence of immigration and rule on the islands. These include: ‘gover-
nors’ or ‘nobles’ believed to be descendants from the first immigrants
from Bali and East Nusa Tenggara (mel-mel), indigenous land owners
believed to be descendants of the autochthonous islands’ inhabitants
(ren-ren), and the lowest social group believed to be descendants of
prisoners or ‘slaves’ from early tribal battles (iri-iri).
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address the state of their marine environment following the
ecological degradation and overfishing that occurred with the
live fish trade company that had operated in Tanimbar Kei.
This eventually led to the inception of the village LMMA
program a year later wherein focus was strongly on rehabili-
tating damaged reefs. Since then targets have been developed
to incorporate more sophisticated management regimes over
marine resource stocks to enhance sustainability and econom-
ic viability of local people’s marine-oriented livelihoods.
The national I-LMMA program is coordinated by a small
team of four fulltime employees. Additionally four focal area
coordinators (FAC) are employed to oversee and coordinate
program activities in each of I-LMMA’s focal areas.9 Beyond
these positions there are no fulltime paid positions. At com-
munity level all programs share a common organizational
configuration (Fig. 4): three locally-chosen conservation co-
ordinators take a lead in facilitating and managing in-village
activities, and a conservation team of community volunteers
carries out program activities (e.g., conservation interventions,
monitoring). According to I-LMMA protocol, the community
conservation coordinators are elected by the community
where the program is implemented and receive a small month-
ly honorarium for their coordinating duties. Members of the
community conservation team are volunteers who may re-
ceive secondary benefits like meals during activities or occa-
sional remuneration at a daily rate (e.g., for monitoring and
mapping activities). The current FAC for the Kei Islands is
from Tanimbar Kei and doubles in his role as one of the three
community conservation coordinators. Together with the two
other community conservation coordinators they form the
main connection between Tanimbar Kei and the I-LMMA
national program.
LMMAVillage Program Outcomes
The program has designated a 40,000 ha (400 km2) marine
zone around the island as an LMMA, with one small four
hectare permanently closed no-take area designated as a nurs-
ery for trochus shell (Trochus niloticus) population regenera-
tion. Annual trochus shell harvest outside of this no-take area
moreover has been reduced from the previous six-month
opening to a five-day opening period. Annual population
monitoring activities carried out in the first 4 years after the
implementation of the harvest restriction in 2006 showed a
significant annual increase in average trochus size (from
7 cm in 2006 to 13 cm in 2010), and a consistent rise in the
total annual trochus harvest (from 814 kg in 2006 to 2334 kg
in 2010). Similarly, 5-yearly coral monitoring activities that
mapped coral cover around the island between in 2006 and
2011, indicated significant growth of hard corals in areas that
had previously been damaged.
These ecological and socio-economic monitoring activities
are carried out by the community conservation team. Besides
having to report on management effectiveness, these activities
are meant to develop local skills in identifying and under-
standing drivers of local change around the island and build
local capacity for project and database management. These
activities are stipulated in annual work plans that are formu-
lated and managed by the in-village LMMA team with I-
LMMA’s support.
The total LMMA area corresponds with the traditionally
owned marine territory of the Tanimbar Kei people, all of
which falls within the four nautical miles under official district
jurisdiction. The community has gained legal recognition for
the ownership and management rights over the area from sub-
district government, through facilitation provided by I-
LMMA. In a similar vein, the program has facilitated the
formulation of a set of official resource use regulations
(Peraturan Desa Tanimbar Kei, No 1, 2008). This mandates
9 I-LMMA’s four main focal areas include: The Kei Islands and Banda
Islands in Maluku, and The Padaido Islands and Teluk Tanah Merah in
Papua Province.
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Fig. 4 Official organizational structure of the co-management partnership between I-LMMA and Tanimbar Kei
Tanimbar Kei, through village government, to sanction any-
one in violation of the regulations. Using these, the commu-
nity manages outsider fishers who harvest marine resources
without permission from adat leaders or who use destructive
fishing techniques defined as illegal in state regulations, which
are reiterated in the village regulations.
More recent regular seasonal visitation by outside fishers,
most commonly Bugis and Butonese fishers, has prompted
the formulation of a small scale fisheries (SSF) management
plan. Since 2013 the LMMA has become subject to a rotating
system along four equal quadrants that dictates fishing access
annually, so that in any given year one quarter of the LMMA
is closed for fishing. Implementation of this rotational closure
has been agreed upon but has yet to be enforced.
Since 2012 the village LMMA program has imple-
mented a concession system, whereby seasonal fishing
‘licenses’ are sold to outside fishers. This has created a
significant source of collective income, which is managed
by the coordinators in conjunction with adat leaders. At a
meeting involving adat leaders, I-LMMA staff and the
LMMA village program team members (which therefore
also included village government staff), it was agreed that
the income would firstly contribute to financing ongoing
activities of the LMMA village program and secondly be
set aside as collective savings. These savings could be
drawn upon in several instances, but only with consent
of adat leaders and the LMMA village program team. It
was agreed at the meeting that the funds could be used to
support communal events or activities like the annual new
year festivities (commonly celebrated village-wide across
Kei); to support poor households in crisis (i.e., acute food
insecurity or family loss); and to support students who are
in their final year of tertiary education (as the high ex-
penses in the last year was a main reason students in the
past did not complete their studies). Conditions were
moreover established that only residents of Tanimbar
Kei were eligible to appeal for these funds (in the case
of tertiary education support, students’ parents had to be
living on the island). In the first year, these funds were
primarily channeled back into LMMA program activities
to cover operational costs. However in the second year,
next to covering operational program costs, the funds sup-
ported one tertiary student in his final year, helped anoth-
er family overcome a family crisis and provided house-
holds village-wide with rice after government food relief
provisions did not eventuate. Although rice provisions
were handed out across the whole village, including
Mun, the two cases involving family-specific support both
involved families from the 23 rahan structure. Other
‘non-adat’ families were technically eligible for such sup-
port and several were arguably in need of it, however
none of these families applied for such support nor were
they put forward by a third party.
Tanimbar Kei’s Leadership Strategies
through Partnership with I-LMMA
Tanimbar Kei’s collaboration with I-LMMA developed from
an initial series of meetings between I-LMMA staff and the
administrative village government staff. In commencing the
collaboration with Tanimbar Kei, I-LMMA emphasized the
program’s objective to establish marine resource management
regimes through customary governance structures instead of
through the administrative village government, which was the
rule in state-funded development programs. The village
LMMA program would need to be embedded among village
level institutions and coordinated onsite rather than by I-
LMMA from its offsite headquarters. Customary leaders in
Tanimbar Kei were particularly supportive of establishing
the coordinating base in the village since past NGO develop-
ment projects, initiated through village government structures,
had repeatedly led to disappointing outcomes and left villagers
disheartened. Villagers described how on several occasions
external NGO staff collaborated with the village government
at the time to carry out rural appraisals in the community. The
appraisals would inform development proposals for funders,
which the NGO promised to implement once approved.
However, these would rarely come to fruition even though
many respondents suggested that the NGO in fact often re-
ceived money to do so. The process remained vague for most
villagers as participation was focused around village govern-
ment staff and rarely developed further than appraisal stages.
As one elder noted:
We [Tanimbar Kei people] had several NGOs come to
us to start projects […], we always agreed, but they
[local NGOs] always only worked closely with mem-
bers of the [administrative] village government because
they thought those were the most important people in
the village. That is not so in Tanimbar Kei.
(Interview with rahan elder, Tanimbar Kei, November
2010).
These NGO programs regularly bypassed customary
leaders who holdmost authority in the village.Many villagers,
including village government staff at the time, regarded
decision-making in programs not involving adat leaders as
tedious since they often needed to be consulted separately
before decisions could be made, resulting in indirect and hes-
itant leadership over project implementation.
At communal meetings that were initiated by senior mem-
bers of the adat community to commence the LMMA pro-
gram, three villagers were elected into community conserva-
tion coordinating positions. These meetings, although open to
all villagers, were largely attended by villagers related through
the 23 adat houses, and fromMun only the Imamwas present.
The three individuals were selected by a naturally adat-
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dominated audience from a shortlist of ten villagers who had
been identified earlier by prominent adat leaders together with
village government staff (most prominently the village head)
on the basis that they possessed necessary authority and lead-
ership qualities. With exception of one individual (the
Catholic community leader), all individuals on this list were
bound through kin ties to the adat core. The selection proce-
dure for the community conservation team that was also
formed during this meeting involved more specific selection
criteria specified by I-LMMA. As a requirement from I-
LMMA to ensure ‘broad capture’, the community conserva-
tion team had to be made up of seven core youth members
from all parts of the village, while maintaining an open struc-
ture to allow free participation in activities by all (adat and
non-adat) villagers. I-LMMA furthermore insisted on the in-
clusion of two women and a representative from Mun as core
members. However those present at the meeting appeared to
have steered the selection process towards an adat preference,
since all chosen core members of the community conservation
team, including the two women, were part of Tanimbar Kei’s
adat core kin structure (although some had different religious
backgrounds). The selected representative of Mun was also
from an adat rahan; having married a woman from Java, he
had chosen to settle in the Muslim community of Mun at the
wish of his wife. Local leaders justified it on the grounds that
this individual came to the main village frequently to see his
family as opposed to other Mun inhabitants, thus allowing
him to participate in meetings when called. Given that only
the Imam attended the meeting, Mun representation in the
community conservation team following this meeting was
predictably low. While their absence at the meeting was
interpreted by many adat leaders as disinterest, the Imam at-
tributed this to reluctance among many Mun residents to con-
front adat leadership.
I-LMMA’s focus on developing local autonomy and lead-
ership capacity formed its main strategy to gain community
interest, an approach that appealed to many in Tanimbar Kei.
Support for this approach was unsurprising, considering that
villagers frequently made reference to their collective identity
as being distinct from the wider Kei culture. In that vein, I-
LMMA sought to develop in-village social and environmental
project assets through proven collaboration and commitment
of enthusiastic villagers, rather than initiating intervention
with an injection of capital and physical assets. Given that
the project initiation stages ran primarily through adat leader-
ship, responsibility for decision-making in the program
remained strongly aligned with the perspectives and interests
of customary leaders. This gave the program a strong local
adat identity. The program secured further support once the
first formal recognition by subdistrict government of tenure
rights over the marine territory was realized, allowing
Tanimbar Kei leadership to take tangible measures to control
outsider access.
The village LMMA program was regarded by many re-
spondents to have helped elevate living standards. It is worth
noting that the village LMMA program’s inception coincided
with the local seaweed cultivation boom after 2005 (Fig. 2). It
led to an exponential growth in the island’s local economy,
whereby living standards improved and villagers no longer
relied on temporary wage labor from outside the village,
meaning most family members returned permanently to the
village. The economic boom also meant livelihood focus for
most households shifted away from coral reefs, which meant
that restrictions on marine resource harvesting instituted by
the program did not meet the same resistance as experienced
elsewhere. More specifically though, many leaders noted that
the program had reinforced local traditional leadership struc-
tures in what was seen as a critical time of increasing global-
izing influences through increased cash economy, new tech-
nologies, youth pop culture andmedia reaching Tanimbar Kei.
The expansion of the village LMMA program built on local
support through its alliance with dominant adat leaders from
the 23 rahan; rather than through other potential links which
might have included Mun’s fishing-oriented minority Muslim
community.10 Some adat leaders referred to the program as
their own local initiative, downplaying I-LMMA’s facilitating
support, and the program was frequently used in narratives of
the communities’ distinctiveness from neighboring
communities,
We [Tanimbar Kei people] are not like them [villages on
neighboring islands] […] you can see we are the only
village that have maps and fishing rules which we made
ourselves […] we take care of ourselves.
(Interview with rahan elder, Tanimbar Kei, November
2010)
In contrast members of Mun households often spoke of
their lack of knowledge of the program when asked to com-
ment on particular interventions, BWe [Mun residents] are not
the correct people to ask about these things [implementing
trochus management interventions][…] we are not really in-
volved in what they [villagers from the main village] do^
(Interview with Mun resident, Tanimbar Kei, February
2011). Mun households did not engage in trochus shell col-
lection or trade as part of their livelihood strategy, therefore
restrictions on trochus shell harvest triggered neither interest
nor resistance among Mun residents. When asked, Mun
households did however express concern regarding the rota-
tional fishing closure system, for two main reasons. First and
foremost the access restriction to regular fishing grounds they
visited would possibly mean a loss in income, and secondly
10 Arguably, recognition of Mun as a formal hamlet in the village admin-
istrative structure may have provided avenue for better representation of
Mun interests.
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these restrictions meant that they could no longer offer fishing
access to visiting Bugis fishers. These reservations, however
did not lead to collective efforts by Mun residents to raise this
issue with village leadership or with the community conser-
vation team, likely because the rotational closure system was
yet to be enforced implying that their fishing had yet to be
impinged upon.
‘Winners’ and ‘Losers’ from Conservation Program
Outcomes
In understanding the adat leaders’ dominant role in the
LMMA village program, it is important to take note of the
program’s impacts in terms of conservation outcomes and
benefit distribution (Table 1). Examining which groups have
benefited from activities, and which have been negatively af-
fected or are likely to be affected in the long term, indicates
not only the appropriation and mediation capacities of the
adat-dominated leadership but also the position of the minor-
ity group and what implications that might have for future
program management.
With the exception of outside Bugis and Butonese fishers,
Table 1 presents no clear immediate ‘losers’ related to conser-
vation interventions. Four factors play a role in accounting for
this. Firstly, restrictive measures associated with trochus har-
vest, where one would expect resistance, were readily accept-
ed throughout the village largely due to the prominent liveli-
hood shift towards seaweed farming which relieved local peo-
ples’ dependence on marine resources. Secondly, minority
groups like the Mun residents, who did not necessarily share
adat interests, nevertheless were less likely to resist restric-
tions since that might jeopardize arrangements with the adat
leadership which thus far allowed for continuity of their live-
lihood pursuits. Thirdly, the cases where collective benefits
from concessions were distributed across the whole village
(i.e. rice provision and the new year celebrations) indicate that
customary leaders did acknowledge the needs of other groups.
So although arguably limited, these other groups did receive
some form of benefit. Lastly, in the context of adat-dominated
leadership, I-LMMA’s criteria for participation of peripheral
groups, although steered by adat leaders, did urge those
leaders to incorporate measures for wider participation.
In examining who ‘won’, the adat core group certainly
benefited significantly from the LMMA village program.
With legal rights and village regulations crafted around adat
norms and adatmembers taking up program positions (imply-
ing higher exposure to opportunity for skills development),
suggests an active appropriation of opportunities by adat
leaders. This sway in the balance of authority and potential
benefit distribution in favor of the adat core group, and the
consequent points of tensions with minority groups that may
emerge, suggests minority groups may increasingly find
themselves disadvantaged. Indication of this tension already
appeared during the community conservation team’s catch
monitoring activities, which involved gathering catch landing
data from outsider seasonal fishing groups. Many Mun resi-
dents have Bugis ancestry, which means that they maintain
significant ties across extensive Bugis diaspora networks. In
their seasonal fishing activities around Tanimbar Kei outside
Bugis fishers use Mun as a base of operation.Whereas outside
Butonese fishers were seen by the community conservation
team to cooperate willingly, significant antagonism existed
towards Bugis fishers. LMMA conservation team members
noted that cooperation with Bugis fishers was difficult and
complicated by their links to Mun.
Getting information from them [Bugis fishers] is always
more difficult [than from the Butonese fishers], they do
not like to work with us and are unreliable […], they
always stay inMun for a long time especially during the
flying fish season, but they do not want to follow our
[LMMAvillage program] rules.
(Interview with community conservation team member,
Tanimbar Kei, March 2015).
Restrictive measures on where and what can be fished, and
imposition of payments for seasonal fishing concessions to all
outside fisher groups, undermines Mun residents’ particular
relationship with outside Bugis fishers and so too their con-
nection to those networks. Without active participation and
opportunity for skills development for Mun residents, and
without extra efforts to inform Mun residents of the impor-
tance of conservation measures for their livelihood security,
they appear unlikely to compromise the existing safety nets
they maintain through links to extensive Bugis diaspora
networks.
Reflecting on Strategic Leadership
Aligning Adat Norms with Official Leadership Roles
Following community-wide recognition of the need to man-
age marine resources more sustainably, distinct new leader-
ship roles and functions have formed out of encounters be-
tween community leaders and I-LMMA. The collaborations
were used in different ways to promote not only collective
interests but also the particular political interests of the adat
group. The primary function of the administrative village gov-
ernment was locally understood to facilitate the flow of re-
sources from state development projects to the village and to
facilitate official engagements with external organizations,
first and foremost with government authorities. On the other
hand, internal village governance matters, especially social
matters, still fell to the responsibility of the local adat leaders
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who used their norm-rooted authority to mold conservation
and development programs to those customs and values.
With village leadership embedded in local dominant adat
norms and with village government positions predominantly
filled by adat core members, adat structures have been rein-
forced through I-LMMA’s intervention. Individuals from the
adat group were unsurprisingly appointed to program coordi-
nating positions following consultation with I-LMMA. The
village secretary, for example, was a head of one of the 23
rahan, but alongside his official role in village government he
also was the financial coordinator in the LMMA program.
Similarly, the second program coordinator, who doubled as
the focal area coordinator, is in line to inherit the position as
head of his rahan, and also functioned as the village facilitator
in the national community development program (PNPM).
Only the third coordinator, being the Catholic leader, was
not a kin-member of a rahan. However his position was also
close to the adat core by marriage into one of the 23 rahan to
which he had aligned himself over the years. All three of these
individuals may not have had the same local authority as adat
elders, however their alignment with adatmeans they enacted
those norms in engaging with outside actors while drawing
from technical skills that adat elders often lacked.
Concessions of Adat Leadership Following I-LMMA
Criteria
In collaborating with I-LMMA adat leaders made certain con-
cessions regarding recruitment for the village LMMA pro-
gram, which followed particular criteria that I-LMMA re-
quired to ensure broad participation. I-LMMA urged the in-
clusion of at least two women and a representative from Mun
to be part of the core community conservation team. These
criteria were met, however the selection of these individuals
was strategic in that both women and the Mun representative
who were eventually involved were each from adat lineages.
I-LMMA’s recruitment criteria were also implicated in the
selection of the three coordinators, by inclusion of a younger
person among the three coordinating positions. This was in
part to ensure sustainability of the program, to transcend gen-
erational divides and to involve individuals with the skills and
learning potential of the younger generation. This led to the
recruitment of the second coordinator, who later would also
come to function as the focal area coordinator. Although it was
likely that this person would come to play an important role in
future adat leadership, being the first son of one of the rahan
heads, his rapid rise into the coordinator position resulted from
his selection by adat leaders following I-LMMA’s criteria.
This initial exposure as a coordinator in the village LMMA
program has led to similar coordinating roles being assigned
to him in other unrelated projects, as for example the village
facilitator under government sponsored rural development
projects. As important as his adat association, was the fact
that he exhibited exceptional skills in both communicating
with authorities and mobilizing local resources and people to
‘get things done’ in village projects. The elevation of individ-
uals to leadership positions appears then to be based on more
than simply adat association, but also on personality, per-
ceived skills and a proven track record. Although the initial
opportunity to show these skills was through an I-LMMA
intervention, adat leaders’ decision to build upon this has
elevated his position into one of broader village planning
and leadership.
To maintain collaboration with I-LMMA the adat leadership
recognized the need to make important concessions in their
recruitment of program leaders. Their adherence to I-LMMA’s
recruitment criteria was somewhat consolidated by measures in
the recruitment process that would prevent loss of adat repre-
sentation. As a result in negotiating criteria and identifying
individuals matching those, the candidates’ adat ties appeared
to be of prominent, but not determinate, importance.
Utilizing Outside Links to Strengthen Local Leadership
Legitimacy
From its inception, the village LMMA program provided op-
portunities for prominent adat engagement. Beyond the pri-
mary gains of improved management of the island’s marine
resources and the collective income generated from it, the
collaboration over time proved beneficial to the position of
adat leadership. First and foremost I-LMMA’s primary align-
ment with the adat social institutions meant resources and
personnel were allocated largely through adat engagement.
This strengthened the existing dominance of the adat core’s
leadership in internal decision-making and patterns of partic-
ipation within the village. It further reinforced the norms and
values by which the community was internally governed.
Recognizing that I-LMMA’s inception strategy involved a de-
liberate alignment with customary institutions, it is important
also to note the relative weakness of the village government
(dinas) structures in Tanimbar Kei, and indeed throughout
Indonesia (Hidayat and Antlov 2004; Antlov and Eko 2012),
and the fact that there was no other sub-group within
Tanimbar Kei that would have the experience or governance
legitimacy to accomplish much in the short term. Moreover,
developing artificially established institutions is found in the
literature to rarely take genuine root (Acheson 2006). In ac-
knowledging these points, it may be suggested that I-LMMA
had few other starting point options for collaboration be-
yond that with the established adat institutions. I-
LMMA’s criteria for expanded representation appears then
to have adapted an existing recruitment process dictated
by adat interests to a more inclusive arrangement, rather
than institutionalizing a (new) and arguably more demo-
cratic one that would in the short term undoubtedly have
been less effective.
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Secondly, the collaboration yielded official recognition of
local adat among institutions beyond the community. Under
district level legislation, subdistrict authorities accepted
Tanimbar Kei’s ownership and management rights over the
community’s marine territory based on adat claims to those
areas. This provided for the first time a mechanism whereby
Tanimbar Kei’s adat rules could be applied legitimately to
outsiders, in, for example, its capacity under district law to
sanction the intrusion of outside illegal fishers who were fish-
ing without permission or using illegal fishing methods. The
institutional channel through which these regulations were
carried out was the administrative village government; how-
ever, the principles of local autonomy and ownership on
which these regulations are founded reflected strong interests
in the recognition of local adat norms. This was also evident
in that all village government staff were also adat affiliated.
Within the village, the engagement with I-LMMA fortified
local leadership and maintained legitimacy of adat institutions
in times of rapid socio-economic and political change on the
island, arising from dramatic changes through democratiza-
tion and decentralization policies that recognized previously
deprived customary community property rights and enhanced
village autonomy. The close community engagement of I-
LMMA’s grassroots approach, provided opportunity for the
dominant rahan groups at the time to strengthen particular
leadership constellations over other potential arrangements,
in particular, the potential for more prominent leadership roles
among minority migrant and Muslim household groups.
Leadership Representation
Members fromMun households who were not related to the 23
rahan had little input in the decision-making processes.
Although Mun households had a stronger seaward livelihood
orientation, in part because as in-migrants they had no legiti-
mate claim to land, their inclusion in decision-making about
access to and use of marine areas remained low. Their partici-
pation was limited to consultation meetings that involved pri-
marily informing Mun residents of plans to establish no-take
zones for input around the implementation, rather than partici-
pation, at earlier planning and design stages. Mun residents’
reluctance to attend open meetings indicates that this exclusion
was not apparently contested, and may have been chosen by
Mun residents themselves. Their fishing and seaweed based
livelihoods meant they could operate in spaces that did not
impinge necessarily on others in the main village, and vice
versa.11 The local divide between Mun and the main village,
exacerbated by geographic separation, has over time resulted in
a sense of autonomy amongst Mun residents, which they
enacted in spaces that were made available to them by the
dominant adat social group. As long as Mun residents’
livelihood activities were unaffected, there appeared lit-
tle interest in representation in decision-making process-
es of the LMMA village program. This was to avoid
compromising that autonomy they maintained on the
periphery. I-LMMA’s measures for input across the vil-
lage, through insistence that meetings be held in Mun or
by encouraging invitations for Mun residents to partici-
pate in project activities, were thus not only subject to
adat domination of village leadership, but also to the
reluctance by Mun residents to become involved or
speak up.
I-LMMA’s strategy was to gain community-wide in-
terest through the dominant adat group. It is unsurpris-
ing then that interests were represented which primarily
reflected their norms and ideals. The power differentials
between groups within a village clearly play out in how
decentralization and democratization of decision-making
take shape (Béné et al. 2009). As a consequence there
appears very little direct engagement between peripheral
groups and I-LMMA. The substantial marginalization of
minorities leaves potentially important interest groups
without meaningful roles.
In the context of marine conservation in Tanimbar Kei,
given the strong seaward orientation of Mun residents, their
lack of involvement in decision-making and implementation
potentially compromises effective long-term management.
Resistance from groups like Mun will likely emerge if future
conservation measures were to significantly impinge on their
livelihoods or social relationships. The LMMA village pro-
gram is increasingly focusing on management of outside fish-
ers, evident in the formulation of the village fishing regula-
tions that stipulate sanctions for illegal or unlicensed fishing
by outsiders. With a majority of such outside fishers being of
Bugis origin, tensions between Mun and the main village
are likely to develop. Gunawan and Visser (2012) simi-
larly note the importance of such extensive diaspora net-
works for access of mobile fisher groups like the Bugis to
particular fishing grounds, through interdependent patron-
age networks with ethnically related residents. They argue
that such extensive socio-economic networks make bor-
ders, or place-based restrictive measures that are meant to
control access, less effective, or what they term as ‘per-
meable’ (Gunawan and Visser 2012: 199). In Tanimbar
Kei’s waters there is a recognized need to address the
issue of illegal outside fishers. However the fact that the
resource use regulations are enacted through village gov-
ernment, which is dominated by adat core representatives,
and that the village LMMA program sees little close par-
ticipation by Mun residents, implies that a potential means
to engage more effectively with these outside fishers is
eliminated.
11 Being located further from the main village, Mun residents used tidal
zones for seaweed farming that by default were too far for villagers from
the main village, meaning no tenure issues arose over seaweed farming.
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Conclusion
The article focused on the interactions between intra-village
leadership constellations and external agencies. The case
study sought to highlight the dynamics and the morphologies
of local leadership, in customary leaders’ efforts to control
implementation and benefit distribution so that projects are
deemed useful locally. The study explicitly centers around
these interactions to illustrate in particular the ability of leaders
representing Tanimbar Kei’s adat core of 23 houses or rahan
to dominate collaboration with an environmental NGO in a
way that addressed concerns over environmental management
while corroborating their local leadership position in the wider
village.
The ongoing and effective collaboration with I-LMMA
since 2005 functioned through direct links to the mediating
adat core leadership. This provided the opportunity to ad-
dress issues of environmental degradation that had signifi-
cantly impacted all residents on the island. The program
was channeled through the strong customary governance
structure already in place. Evidently, the adat core and its
leading families, were active in the recruitment of villagers
and establishment of particular paths for defining and en-
hancing community resources and determining who could
access them. The adat core group succeeded in developing
means to enhance the external legitimation of their leader-
ship positions, in order to manage marine resources within
zones officially devolved to local governance (i.e., an area
of four nautical miles). Despite this dominance there was
significant evidence that the control over the LMMA vil-
lage program was not entirely directed towards dominant
group appropriation but also that needs of other groups
were mediated and to a certain extent that wider benefit
distribution occurred.
External organizations seeking to establish collaborative
arrangements with communities must acknowledge that such
partnerships come to function in arenas where on the one hand
established interests are likely to divert new paradigms of
practice, but on the other hand local leadership constellations
have the potential to benefit from the introduction of more
inclusive governance practices. Individuals in leadership po-
sitions, who mediate between community and NGOs such as
I-LMMA, channel information and guide project implemen-
tation according to established social relationships and ac-
countabilities in these communities. It is important not only
to recognize how dominant leadership groups function in re-
lation to heterogeneous community constituencies they repre-
sent, but also to identify particular constituencies that do not
receive representation. Mun residents’ position, as primarily
fishers, makes them an important stakeholder in discussions
on marine resource management. However with the majority
of Mun residents having limited kinship or other associations
with the adat core group, their involvement remained highly
peripheral despite some participation measures fostered
through I-LMMA. These mechanisms for broad representa-
tion were defused partially by the influential adat leadership
and partially by Mun residents’ own reluctance to face adat
leadership. Without active contestation from Mun, their ab-
sence in the adat core dominated decision-making process is
likely to remain unaddressed. It is plausible that resistance by
Mun residents to the LMMA village program may arise if
measures are introduced that increasingly restrict access to
important marine resources for them or that compromise im-
portant social-economic and cultural networks they maintain
with outside Bugis fishers. In identifying such emerging ten-
sions and with sufficient adaptive capacity in the management
framework, adjustments can be made to expand participation
and prevent collapse.
The positive conservation outcomes in the LMMA village
program’s first decade of operation, suggest that the domina-
tion of the adat core in Tanimbar Kei should not be interpreted
to imply ‘failure’ or an unambiguous case of ‘elite capture’.
This case supports arguments which suggest that cooperation
by external agencies with dominant local groups and elite
individuals provide valuable entry points for engaging com-
munities in conservation and sustainable development initia-
tives. However, being aware of tensions and potential gaps in
representation is critical to the adaptive local management and
benefit distribution that would enable long-term sustainable
management (Sutton and Rudd 2014). External mediation
stands to play an important part in steering established gover-
nance patterns in more inclusive directions. Critical is the way
that external agencies engage locally. The extent of knowl-
edge, creativity, sensitivity and communicative ability of
community-based outreach staff and their engagement with
local culture brokers, will determine how effective negotia-
tions across subtle socio-political divides occur, and how
adaptive management structures will prove to be during shifts
in such divides. In line with Cleaver’s (2012) argumentation
for bricolage effects, the case study shows that a systematic
focus on inclusion in locally based (and driven) interventions
could bring about more effective resource governance.
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